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Abstract 
 
This paper describes and analyzes the occurrence and extent of oppositions initiated 
against plant biotechnology patents granted by the European Patent Office (EPO). The 
opposition mechanism is a legal procedure that allows any third party to challenge the 
validity of patents awarded by the EPO. Results indicate that the opposition rate is far 
greater in plant biotechnology than in other emerging industries. Consistent with 
theoretical predictions, the empirical findings suggest that opposed patents are 
disproportionately those that score high on features that proxy for their “value” or 
“quality”. In contrast to previous findings, however, the results show that large-volume 
applicants are more likely to be opposed. Because the boundaries of plant biotech 
patents are ill-defined, large patent portfolios do not promote cooperative behavior such 
as licensing or settlements. The analysis rejects the hypothesis that awardees are subject 
to “nuisance” or “frivolous” oppositions. Instead, the opposition procedure serves as an 
error correction mechanism. 
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1. Introduction 
Genetic engineering of plants has a wide array of applications ranging from resistant crops to 
pharmaceutical products and alternative sources of energy. Despite the claimed benefits of genetic 
engineering, it is a highly contentious issue subject to stringent regulation. Public policies have 
fundamentally altered the conditions under which innovations are patented and pursued. The 
competitive and regulatory environment of plant biotechnology provides therefore an opportunity to 
analyze the management of innovation and rivalry between firms in this nascent technology. 
This paper analyzes the occurrence and extent of oppositions initiated against plant biotechnology 
patents granted by the European Patent Office (EPO). The opposition mechanism is a legal 
procedure that allows any third party to challenge the validity of patents awarded by the EPO. 
Previous literature shows that the breadth of patent protection in plant biotechnology is 
characterized by high levels of uncertainty (Graff et al., 2003). The opposition mechanism is 
therefore crucial to determine the boundaries of patent awards. 
The paper discusses patent oppositions in plant biotechnology within the framework of theoretical 
models of legal dispute. The paper shows that the opposition rate is far greater in plant 
biotechnologies than in other emerging industries. Consistent with theoretical predictions, the 
empirical findings show that opposed patents are disproportionately those whose proxy variables for 
“value” or “quality” are high. However, in contrast to previous findings, results show that large-
volume applicants are more likely to be opposed. Because the boundaries of plant biotech patents 
are ill-defined, large applicants resort to legal actions against technological rivals as an alternative 
to cooperative solutions such as licensing or settlements. Finally, the paper examines the possibility 
that awardees are subject to “nuisance” or “frivolous” oppositions and reject this hypothesis. 
Instead, the opposition procedure serves as a correction mechanism of errors made in the 
examination process.   
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a short overview of the plant biotechnology 
industry structure. Section 3 presents the application and opposition procedures at the EPO. Section 
4 reviews the relevant literature and discusses the predictions from the theoretical literature. Section 
5 describes the construction of the dataset. Section 6 carries out the empirical analysis and Section 7 
concludes.  
       
2. Industry structure and patenting activity in Plant Biotechnology 
The structure of the plant biotechnology sector is characterized by two trends. First, it is a heavily 
concentrated industry. A large number of mergers and acquisitions since the 1990’s have resulted in 
few multi-national companies dominating the market, abusive business practices and a decline of 
entry by new firms (Brennan et al., 2000; Harhoff et al. 2001). 
Second, it is a heavily regulated industry. Because of consumers’ opposition to genetically-modified 
(GM) foods and fear of environmental hazards, governments exercise regulatory oversight of new 
varieties of genetically engineered crops and in some cases even banned the cultivation of new GM 
crops.  
Innovation in plant biotechnology often requires the input of several first-generation “research 
tools” and the range of technologies necessary to bring a new product to the market is usually 
controlled by several firms. Therefore, an innovator may have to acquire a disparate set of outside 
technologies to bring a new product to the market by negotiating licenses with several parties. 
However, bargaining may break down, putting the second generation product in jeopardy (Heller 
and Eisenberg, 1998). 
Ziedonis (2004) shows that in the U.S. semi-conductor industry, firms tend to patent more 
aggressively when the ownership rights to outside technologies are widely distributed among 
different organizations. Because these firms are concerned about “hold-up”, the strategic value of 
patents for use in ex-post bargaining and licensing agreements increases. In addition, Hall and 
Ziedonis (2001) observe that the semi-conductor industry has witnessed a substantial vertical 
disintegration as stronger U.S. patent rights have stimulated entry by specialized firms. 
Although patenting in the plant biotechnology sector also requires access to complementary 
intellectual assets, the industry has witnessed a comprehensive consolidation through mergers and 
acquisitions (M&As). Why did the market respond differently in plant biotech than in e.g. the semi-
conductor industry? Graff et al. (2003) argue that patents in the plant biotech sector are often 
uncertain and ill-defined. It seems to be difficult for Patent Offices (PTOs) to define the scope and 
boundaries of these patents in a reliable way. Therefore licensing agreements will be inhibited, 
because coordinating uncertain property rights raises transaction costs and makes contracting over 
patent rights less desirable. 
Graff et al. (2003) argue that the reorganization of the industry can be explained by the desire to 
exploit complementary intellectual assets owned by different parties. M&As may have avoided 
situations in which two parties hold mutually blocking technologies. Marco and Rausser (2008) 
show that patent statistics can effectively predict the timing of M&A in plant biotech. The literature 
points to the fact that plant biotech firms tend to exploit the complementarities between intellectual 
assets internally, through M&As, whereas in other industries, such as the semi-conductor, firms 
tend to exploit them externally through licensing or bargaining. 
3. Application and opposition procedures at the EPO 
The EPO was founded in 1978 as the result of the European Patent Convention (EPC). Within this 
framework, a single and centralized application is made, designating the signatory states of the EPC 
in which protection is sought for by the applicant. Therefore, a patent provides the applicant with 
protection in all the designated states. If patent protection is sought for in more than three EPC 
countries, an EPO patent application is less costly than direct applications in each national patent 
office. If a European patent is granted, competence is transferred to the designated contracting 
states, where the patent affords the same level of legal protection as a national patent and is valid 
for 20 years from the date of filling, if it is consecutively renewed. 
Once a patent is granted by the EPO, the applicant has to enforce it in each state designated in the 
application, according to the national legislations. However, the opposition procedure at the EPO 
allows any third party to challenge the validity of a patent centrally within nine months after the 
announcement of the grant. An opposition may only be filed on grounds relating to the patentability 
of the invention (EPC art. 100). The plaintiff will have to demonstrate that the opposed patent lacks 
novelty, does not involve an inventive step, does not have an industrial application or that 
disclosure is insufficient. More details on the opposition procedure are provided in Harhoff (2005). 
Because patents in plant biotechnology are poorly defined, opposition proceedings are an important 
institutional mechanism to delineate the boundaries of patents. 
4. Theoretical background 
This Section discusses the hypotheses pertaining to the empirical analysis 
4.1. Modeling patent oppositions 
The economic analysis of legal disputes predicts that the occurrence and outcome of a lawsuit will 
be a function of expected payoffs (Priest and Klein, 1984). Four factors were found to increase the 
probability of a legal dispute taking place (Cooter and Rubinfeld, 1989): The likelihood that the 
offence is detected by a potential plaintiff; Asymmetric expectations or diverging expectations 
between the parties about the outcome of the lawsuit (i.e. higher uncertainty); The size of the stakes 
under dispute; The cost of settlement relative to the cost of trial. 
These considerations were taken forward to the case of patent litigation in the U.S. (Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 2001, 2004a; Lerner, 2008) and patent opposition at the EPO (Harhoff and Reitzig, 
2004). Based on the four factors enumerated before, we would expect the likelihood of opposition 
to increase in the following situations: First, the extent to which low legal quality is detected may be 
a function of the characteristics of the patent. Examiners at the EPO are in charge of searching prior 
art and classify them into different categories according to their relevance. Therefore, the 
classification of references in “critical” categories may attract the attention of plaintiffs (Harhoff 
and Reitzig, 2004). 
Second, Gans et al. (2008) show that longer reviews at the patent office create uncertainty. 
Therefore the grant lag (the number of years the application was under review at the EPO) may be 
positively associated with the likelihood of opposition, as it exacerbates uncertainty and reflects the 
complexity of the subject matter (Harhoff and Reitzig, 2004). 
Third, the size of the stakes or the value of patents can be captured by several proxies identified in 
the literature, such as forward citations (Trajtenberg, 1990), backward citations (Harhoff et al., 
2003), the family size of the patent (Lanjouw et al., 1998) or the number of claims (Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 2004b).           
 Fourth, the cost of settlement relative to that of trial can be proxied by the identity of the patentee, 
as differences are likely to arise between corporate patentees and individuals or small firms 
(Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2001, 2004a).  
Moreover, Lanjouw and Schankerman (2004a) and Harhoff and Reitzig (2004) show that prolific 
patentees hold potential advantages in legal disputes. First, large patent portfolios make cooperative 
solutions such as licensing or cross-licensing an alternative option to opposition by allowing 
patentees to trade their intellectual assets. Second, patentees with large portfolios are likely to be 
involved in repeated interactions, which will make settlement solutions more desirable. Third, any 
patent part of a larger portfolio will only have a marginal impact both on the defendant and the 
plaintiff’s payoffs if it is revoked (or narrowed down). Consequently, a cooperative outcome is 
more likely. 
4.2 Strategic oppositions 
Alternative models of legal disputes discuss situations in which a potential plaintiff might file a suit 
that has a negative expected value (Bebchuk, 1988; P’ng, 1983; Rosenberg and Shavell, 1985). 
These models of “nuisance”, “frivolous” or “sham” litigation imply that legal disputes are used by 
plaintiffs to attain strategic objectives such as the extraction of a settlement offer. Plaintiffs might 
therefore bring opposition cases for strategic reasons, such as deterrence of future entry, or to 
establish a reputation for toughness (Harhoff, 2005).   
If this behavior is prevalent in the Plant Biotech sector, then we should observe high shares of 
judgments in favor of the defendant in opposition cases.  
 
 
5. Data and descriptive statistics 
5.1. Construction of the sample  
Patents: The “Espace Bulletin” database provided by the EPO contains procedural information for 
all patent applications. The empirical analysis uses all patents awarded between 1978 through 2007. 
Plant biotechnology patent awards were selected according to the International Patent Classification 
(IPC) and European Classification (ECLA) systems.1 The dataset contains the main features of the 
patent awards and information on the occurrence of opposition.  
Claims: The number of claims for each patent award is available on the EPO’s online search 
engine.2 
Citations: The “EPO/OECD Patent Citation Database” contains all references from the EPO search 
reports, for patents applied for in the period 1978 through 2006 (see Webb et al., 2005). The 
empirical analysis uses the forward and backward citations for each patent.  
Identification of applicants: Patentees were identified manually, using various online sources,3 and 
the patents were classified into different categories, according to the type of organization listed as 
the applicant.  
 
 
                                                            
1 Patents were selected if their ECLA code is: C12N15/82C “Phenotypically and genetically modified plants via 
recombinant DNA technology” 
2 http://ep.espacenet.com/  
3 Amadeus and Orbis were the main data sources. If the organization was not found in these databases, I consulted 
their website. 
5.2. Variables 
Number of claims. The application contains a set of claims delineating the boundaries of the patent 
by describing the precise features of the invention. Empirical evidence shows that the number of 
claims is correlated with the value of a patented invention.    
Number of backward citations. The search report published by the EPO contains a list of prior art 
relevant for the assessment of a patent application. Empirical evidence show that backward citations 
are correlated with the value of a patent (Harhoff et al., 2003), which suggests that the number of 
citations corresponds to the extent of patenting in a given technological area (Lanjouw and 
Schankerman, 2001) and therefore to the potential profitability of inventions falling into that 
domain. Everything else equal, patents with more backward citations should be opposed more often. 
Share of X and Y backward citations. Backward citations at the EPO are classified into different 
categories by the examiner during the search procedure, according to their relevance for the 
evaluation of the patentability of the invention. Two interesting categories for the evaluation of the 
novelty of an invention are: 
- "Type X" citations. References classified into this category indicate material that is potentially 
harmful to the novelty or inventive step requirements of the claimed invention.  
- "Type Y" citations indicate material that is potentially harmful to the inventive step requirement    
of the claimed invention, when the referenced document is combined with one or more other 
documents of the same category, such a combination being obvious to a person skilled in the art. 
The empirical analysis uses the sum of X and Y citations, relative to the total number of backward 
citations. This measure is (inversely) correlated with the degree of novelty and/or inventive step of 
the claimed invention and a high share of those critical references is therefore likely to attract the 
attention of potential plaintiffs (Harhoff and Reitzig, 2004).  
The Number of forward citations is defined as the number of citations received by a focal patent 
from any subsequent patent application and measures the “importance”, the “quality” or the 
“significance” of a patented invention. Previous studies show that forward citations are highly 
correlated with the social value of the patented invention (Trajtenberg, 1990, for the computer 
tomography industry) and with its private value (Harhoff et al., 1999, Hall et al., 2005). 
Furthermore, forward citations reflect the economic and technological “importance” as perceived by 
the inventors themselves (Jaffe et al., 2000) and knowledgeable peers in the technology field 
(Albert et al., 1991).  
The likelihood of opposition is expected to increase with the economic and technological 
importance of a given patent, as the size of the stakes increase for both parties. 
Number of designated states. EPO applicants have to specify the states member of the European 
Patent Convention (EPC) in which protection is sought for. Harhoff et al. (2003) and Lanjouw et al. 
(1998) show that the size of the target market is correlated with the value of the patent. 
The grant lag (in years) measures the time elapsed between the dates of application and grant of a 
focal patent. The duration of the examination procedure is, among other things, influenced by the 
complexity of the invention and the intensity of negotiations between the examiner and the 
applicant (Harhoff and Wagner, 2005). Therefore, the probability of opposition is expected to 
increase with the grant lag, because longer pendencies will lead to higher levels of uncertainty 
(Gans et al., 2008). 
Patent scope is defined as the number of non-identical international patent classes (IPC), at the 4-
digit level, assigned to the patent. Lerner (1994) suggests that the broader a patent, the more 
potential opponents it may have. However, Harhoff and Reitzig (2004) find that the likelihood of 
opposition decreases with the number of IPC assignments. They argue that broader patents are more 
general and have less immediate relevance for market outcomes. 
The Portfolio size is the count of patent awarded to each firm. The measure follows Lanjouw and 
Schankerman (2004a) who define the relevant portfolio as the number of patents awarded to the 
applicant within five years in either direction of the application year of the focal patent. All 
estimations presented in the paper are robust to alternative specification of the patent portfolio size. 
Ownership. Awardees are classified into five categories: large firms (with more than 1000 
employees), small firms (less than 1000 employees), universities and public research institutes 
(PRIs), public-private partnerships (i.e. involving a university and a corporation) and others (mainly 
individuals). 
Grant years. Finally, dummies for grant year intervals control for any remaining unobserved 
fluctuation over time. 
5.3. Descriptive statistics 
5.3.1. Major trends 
Figure 1 shows that the number of plant biotechnology patents exhibits a rapid growth through 
2000. In 1999, the European Union (EU) member States agreed to suspend the approval of new GM 
crops, which curbed the inflow of patent fillings from 2000 onwards. 
 
Figure 1: Number of plant biotech applications and awards 
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Figure 2 shows that the grant rate of plant biotech patents has been declining steadily over time, 
while the number of applications still under review at the EPO by 2008 increased substantially. 
Figure 2 also shows that decisions for some applications filled in the beginning of the 1990’s are 
currently still pending, while the overall grant rate is indeed much smaller than for patents as a 
whole (Harhoff and Wagner, 2005). These trends reflect the uncertainty that characterizes plant 
biotech patents, arising from the difficulty of assessing the novelty of an invention and of 
establishing the appropriate state of the art.  
Figure 2: Outcome of patent applications 
 
5.3.2. Summary statistics 
Table 1 provides an overview of the patents included in the sample. Several patterns emerge. 
While the average application was filed in the middle of the period under review, patent awards are 
concentrated in the second half of the sample with the mean grant year in 2002. This reflects the 
long decision lags faced by applicants. The average grant lag (6.7 years) is indeed much higer than 
in other emerging technologies such as biotechnology and pharmaceuticals (4.8 years, see Harhoff 
and Reitzig, 2004) or financial methods (4.9 years, see Hall et al., 2009). On the other hand, 
opposed patents are concentrated in the first half of the sample, with the average application year in 
1991, suggesting that early awards were more likely to be opposed. 
Plant biotech patents score very high on all features that proxy for their “value” or “quality”, 
compared to e.g. biotechnologies (Harhoff and Reitzig, 2004). They are heavily cited by and citing 
other patents and they are broader as they appear to be more expansive both in the number of claims 
and the number of IPC assignments. 
Plant biotech patents are opposed at a rate almost twice as high than patents as a whole. While most 
patents are not opposed, few of them are extensively so. One patent was attacked simulteanously by 
ten different organizations.   
Universities, PRIs and government intitutes own a larger fraction of patents in plant biotech than in 
any of the other industries mentioned before, confirming that basic science played a critical role in 
the birth of the industry. 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
All patents Opposed patents Non-opposed patents 
Variable Mean S.D. Min. Max. Mean S.D. Mean S.D. 
Patent characteristics 
Application year 1995.341 4.891 1983 2005 1991.276 4.992 1995.848 4.638 
Grant year 2002.085 4.878 1986 2007 1998.143 5.400 2002.576 4.581 
Opposition 0.111 0.314 0 1 
# plaintiffs/opposition 0.216 0.856 0 10 1.949 1.807 
# designated states 15.521 5.042 1 28 13.520 3.896 15.770 5.114 
# claims 20.145 14.339 1 128 22.582 16.849 19.841 13.978 
# backward citations 3.012 2.632 0 18 3.316 2.787 2.975 2.612 
# Backward citations/claim 0.228 0.322 0 5 0.257 0.527 0.225 0.286 
# Forward citations 3.643 4.720 0 30 7.469 7.036 3.166 4.111 
# Forward citations/claim 0.247 0.361 0 2.5 0.462 0.488 0.220 0.333 
Share of X & Y citations 0.396 0.405 0 1 0.366 0.384 0.399 0.407 
Grant lag 6.744 2.580 2 17 6.867 2.431 6.728 2.599 
Number of IPC4 assignments 2.334 0.989 1 6 2.184 0.912 2.353 0.997 
Applicant characteristics 
Portfolio size 18.394 19.481 1 66 20.316 17.538 18.155 19.706 
Large firm (>1000 employees) 0.572 0.495 0 1 0.745 0.438 0.550 0.498 
Small firm (<1000 employees) 0.141 0.348 0 1 0.112 0.317 0.145 0.352 
University/PRI 0.150 0.358 0 1 0.051 0.221 0.163 0.369 
Public-private partnership 0.044 0.205 0 1 0.031 0.173 0.046 0.209 
Others 0.093 0.290 0 1 0.061 0.241 0.097 0.296 
Number of observations 885 98 787 
 
 
Table 2 reports the opposition rate (the number of opposed patents relative to the total number of 
patents) for different types of assignee. There are striking differences with the results found for 
opposition or litigation in other sectors. Contrary to these previous results, it is the patents owned 
by large firms - and not by small firms or individual - that have the highest likelihood of being 
legally attacked. On the other hand, university and PRIs patents have the lowest opposition rate, 
confirming the more basic nature of their inventions. 
Table 2: Opposition rate by type of assignee 
Type of assignee Opposition rate 
Large firms 14.40% 
Small firms 8.80% 
University/PRI 3.73% 
Public-private partnership 7.69% 
Others 7.23% 
 
6. Empirical analysis 
This Section presents estimation results of probability models to explain the occurrence of patent 
oppositions in the plant biotech industry. These estimations employ two alternative dependent 
variables. The first one is a dummy variable that takes on the value one if the focal patent was 
opposed within nine months after the date of the award, the legal deadline to file an opposition. The 
second variable is a count of the number of oppositions that were filed against a focal patent. All 
regressions include the controls suggested by the theoretical literature outlined earlier. 
The empirical analysis employs three different approaches. First, Table 3 features a probit model on 
the likelihood of opposition.  
Second, Table 4 displays Poisson Quasi-Maximum Likelihood estimates (QMLE) with the number 
of plaintiffs as dependent variable.  
Third, Table 5 reports the result of a “zero-altered” (or “zero-inflated”) Poisson model to account 
for the prevalence of zero counts in the data (Greene, 2008). This model assumes that there are two 
latent groups of patents. The first group has an outcome of zero oppositions with probability one, 
whereas patents in the second group have a nonzero probability to have a positive count of 
oppositions. The regime-splitting mechanism is estimated with a probit model that indicates the 
likelihood of being in the group of patents that are never opposed, whereas the conditional count 
variable is assumed to follow a Poisson distribution.  
In each Table, the columns labeled (1) contain the patent related variables and the columns labeled 
(2) add dummies for each type of organization. 
Consistently with theoretical predictions and previous empirical findings, “important” patents as 
proxied by the number of claims and the number of forward citations are more likely to be opposed 
and more extensively so.  
The number of backward citations is only marginally significant on both the probability and the 
intensity of opposition. In the same vein, the share of critical references (X and Y citations) does 
not appear to have any effect on either the occurrence or the extent of oppositions. This is consistent 
with the view that prior art in plant biotech is difficult to assess leading to patents with unclear 
boundaries.    
The grant lag appears to be an important determinant of opposition. Decision lags are influenced by 
the complexity of subject matters and the length of negotiations between applicants and examiners. 
Longer pendencies therefore exacerbate the uncertainty surrounding patent rights.   
The number of IPC assignments negatively affects the number of oppositions filed against a patent. 
This result indicates that it is more difficult for a potential plaintiff to detect opposable patents when 
the claimed invention is assigned to diverse technology areas. 
Surprisingly, the number of EPO countries in which protection is sought for has no impact on the 
likelihood of opposition. In earlier studies this variable was yet found to be highly correlated with 
the private value of patents and therefore to be a major driver of patent oppositions. A potential 
explanation is that the plant biotech industry faces a disparate set of national legislations within the 
EPO member states, with some countries having stringent restrictions on GM crops, while others 
have more liberal legislations. This is consistent with the view that regulation affects entry 
strategies into geographical markets (Kyle, 2007). The number of countries designated in the 
application is therefore a noisy signal and is unlikely to be an accurate proxy of the private value of 
patents in the plant biotech case.  
Earlier findings point to the fact that small firms and firms with small patent portfolios might be at a 
comparative disadvantage in protecting their intellectual assets as their patents were found to be 
disproportionately involved in legal actions. The results presented here paint a different story. First, 
patents parts of large portfolios are more likely to be opposed and face more legal attacks. Second, 
there is no statistical difference between large firms, small firms, and the residual category of 
assignees in the likelihood and extent of opposition. 
The literature shows that large patent portfolios confer an advantage to their owners as cooperative 
solutions such as licensing, trading patents or settlements outside of court are alternatives to legal 
suits. Because individual patents are highly complementary and because the boundaries of patents 
are ill-defined, this conjecture does not hold in the Plant Biotech industry. The results show that 
potential plaintiffs are more likely to resort to legal actions against prolific patentees as opposed to 
cooperative solutions. 
Table 3: estimation results (1) – Probit model of patent opposition 
(1) (2) 
Probit Probit 
  Coef.   S.E. dF/dX Coef.   S.E. dF/dX 
Patent characteristics: 
log # claims 0.522 *** 0.135 0.073 0.535 *** 0.137 0.072
log # forward citations per claim 1.332 *** 0.345 0.187 1.366 *** 0.350 0.184
# Forward citations=0 0.219 0.185 0.033 0.214 0.187 0.031
log # backward citations per claim 0.763 * 0.425 0.107 0.733 * 0.431 0.099
# Backward citations=0 -0.271 0.234 -0.033 -0.223 0.236 -0.027
Share of X & Y citations -0.046 0.171 -0.006 -0.014 0.174 -0.002
log # designated states -0.173 0.153 -0.024 -0.170 0.157 -0.023
log # IPC assignments -0.193 0.152 -0.027 -0.216 0.154 -0.029
log grant lag 0.352 * 0.196 0.049 0.359 * 0.198 0.048
log portfolio size 0.104 ** 0.050 0.015 0.096 * 0.053 0.013
Type of organization (base: university/PRI) 
Small firm 0.610 ** 0.295 0.112
Large firm 0.488 * 0.267 0.063
Public-private partnership 0.116 0.405 0.017
Other 0.661 ** 0.328 0.129
Year dummies - test of joint significance χ2(6)=36.45*** χ2(6)=35.51*** 
Constant -3.809 *** 0.696   -4.317 *** 0.741   
Number of observations 885 
Note: ***(**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: estimation results (2) - Number of opposition fillings per patent 
(1) (2) 
Poisson QMLE Poisson QMLE 
  Coef.   S.E. dF/dX Coef.   S.E. dF/dX 
Patent characteristics: 
log # claims 0.835 *** 0.219 0.180 0.814 *** 0.210 0.176
log # forward citations per claim 1.755 *** 0.404 0.379 1.657 *** 0.412 0.358
# Forward citations=0 0.088 0.306 0.019 0.111 0.298 0.024
log # backward citations per claim 1.569 * 0.835 0.339 1.474 * 0.829 0.318
# Backward citations=0 -0.546 0.404 -0.118 -0.472 0.363 -0.102
Share of X & Y citations 0.049 0.327 0.011 0.139 0.334 0.030
log # designated states -0.349 0.380 -0.075 -0.369 0.373 -0.080
log # IPC assignments -0.575 ** 0.265 -0.124 -0.637 *** 0.263 -0.138
log grant lag 0.686 ** 0.346 0.148 0.774 ** 0.352 0.167
log portfolio size 0.364 *** 0.118 0.079 0.344 *** 0.141 0.074
Type of organization (base: university/PRI) 
Small firm 1.184 ** 0.547 0.255
Large firm 1.040 ** 0.498 0.224
Public-private partnership -0.512 0.789 -0.110
Other 1.076 * 0.617 0.232
Year dummies - test of joint significance χ2(6)=41.71*** χ2(6)=42.00*** 
Constant -6.752 *** 1.369   -7.691 *** 1.321   
Number of observations 885 
Note: ***(**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: estimation results (3) - Number of opposition fillings per patent 
(1) (2) 
Zero-inflated Poisson Zero-inflated Poisson 
Probit Poisson QMLE dF/dX Probit Poisson QMLE dF/dX
  Coef.   S.E. Coef.   S.E.   Coef.   S.E. Coef.   S.E.   
log # claims -0.642 *** 0.237 0.509 **  0.206 0.222 -0.614 ** 0.272 0.613 *** 0.215 0.226
log # forward citations per claim -3.948 *** 1.049 -0.567 0.441 0.564 -4.956 *** 1.148 -0.671 * 0.421 0.616
# Forward citations=0 -1.263 *** 0.469 -0.882 ** 0.356 0.028 -1.544 *** 0.548 -0.872 ** 0.378 0.049
log # backward citations per claim -2.199 ** 1.123 0.650 0.576 0.524 -2.246 * 1.232 0.963 * 0.619 0.552
# Backward citations=0 -0.355 0.494 -0.800 * 0.429 -0.112 -0.818 0.568 -0.991 ** 0.402 -0.088
Share of X & Y citations 0.632 ** 0.323 0.359 0.276 -0.032 0.588 * 0.360 0.356 0.283 -0.013
log # designated states 0.076 0.295 -0.422 0.287 -0.105 0.065 0.315 -0.398 0.294 -0.096
log # IPC assignments -0.670 ** 0.322 -1.354 *** 0.250 -0.177 -0.938 ** 0.404 -1.518 *** 0.256 -0.183
log grant lag -0.366 0.381 0.173 0.410 0.101 -0.306 0.402 0.253 0.381 0.102
log portfolio size -0.054 0.120 0.238 ** 0.109 0.061 0.173 0.174 0.356 *** 0.137 0.050
Small firm -0.675 0.668 0.704 0.712 0.255
Large firm -1.534 ** 0.689 -0.103 0.655 0.213
Public-private partnership -2.187 * 1.176 -1.813 * 1.061 -0.055
Other -0.957 0.787 0.409 0.852 0.235
Year dummies - test of joint significance χ2(6)=14.42** χ2(6)=39.77*** χ2(6)=14.16** χ2(6)=50.70*** 
Constant 3.371 ** 1.441 -2.626 * 1.358   4.451 *** 1.578 -3.265 ** 1.490   
Number of observations 885 (zero observations: 787) 
 
Note: ***(**,*) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%). 
 
An alternative explanation is that large volume applicants may find opposition of their patents more 
costly than do early-stage patentees, possibly because of the risks of damage to their reputation or to 
other lines of business (Lerner, 2008). In that event, prolific applicants may be subject to nuisance 
or frivolous oppositions and targeted by early-stage patentees with lower opposition costs. The 
following analysis explores this possibility. 
A first possibility is that large-volume applicants are targeted by smaller entities. Table 6 reports the 
five most frequently represented firms in the sample along three dimensions: their number of 
patents, the number of their patents that were opposed and the number of opposition proceedings in 
which they are defendants. Strikingly, the same names appear in each category, suggesting that the 
opposition procedure is a game between the largest patentees in the industry. This result is in stark 
contrast with the findings in other industries. For example, Lerner (2008) shows that in the US, the 
most frequent financial patentees are ICT companies, while litigators are dominated by patent 
holding companies and litigated patents are disproportionately those of established financial 
institutions. 
 
Table 6: Most frequently represented assignees 
Patentees # patents Plaintiffs # patents Defendants # patents 
1. Bayer 88 Bayer 20 Syngenta 31 
2. Syngenta 85 Syngenta 20 Bayer 30 
3. Pioneer Hi-Bred 76 Monsanto 16 Monsanto 27 
4. Monsanto 64 BASF 14 BASF 13 
5. Calgene4 41 Mogene 9 Calgene 13 
Pioneer Hi-Bred 9 
 
A second possibility is that large-volume applicants are subject to nuisance or frivolous opposition. 
Table 7 summarizes the frequency of the various outcomes of the opposition proceedings. If 
frivolous opposition is a common practice, then the EPO should reject most of these opposition 
fillings. Table 7 shows that this is not the case. Although the high share of cases that are still 
pending precludes definitive conclusions, these figures are still informative. More than half of the 
opposition fillings result in either an amendment or a revocation of the patent. The distribution of 
opposition outcomes contrasts with the aggregated trend, since each outcome represents roughly 
one third of all decisions in opposition proceedings at the EPO (excluding pending cases, see 
Harhoff, 2005). Because of the large share of amended and revoked patents, opposition fillings in 
plant biotech seem to act as an important correction mechanism of errors from examination 
decisions, rather than being a strategic tool. 
 
 
                                                            
4 Calgene was acquired by Monsanto in 1996. 
 Table 7: outcome of opposition proceedings 
Outcome Frequence Percent 
Opposition rejected 12 12.24% 
Patent amended 25 25.51% 
Patent revoked 30 30.61% 
Opposition terminated 6 6.12% 
Still pending 25 25.51% 
Total 98 100% 
 
7. Conclusion 
This paper analyzes the occurrence and extent of oppositions initiated against plant biotechnology 
patents granted by the European Patent Office (EPO).  
Results show that the opposition rate is far greater in plant biotechnology than in other emerging 
industries and that opposed patents are disproportionately those that score high on features that 
proxy for their “value” or “quality”. This finding is consistent with theoretical predictions from the 
literature on legal disputes and with earlier results from the literature on patent litigation and 
opposition.  
However, contrary to previous results, the paper shows that the various types of assignees face the 
same likelihood of opposition (compared to universities). Instead, the size of the patent portfolio has 
a larger impact both on the likelihood and the intensity of opposition. Contrary to previous findings, 
large portfolios do not promote cooperative behavior, because coordinating uncertain property 
rights raises transaction costs and makes contracting over patent rights or settlements less desirable 
relative to the cost of opposition. 
Finally, the paper investigates the possibility that awardees are subject to “nuisance” or “frivolous” 
oppositions and the analysis rejects this hypothesis. Instead, it seems that the opposition procedure 
serve as an error correction mechanism. 
These results suggest avenues for future research. Much remains to be understood about the 
dynamic and reputation-building aspects of patent oppositions. Moreover, it is unclear whether the 
structure of the plant biotech industry and the high levels of oppositions are detrimental or favorable 
to innovation and social welfare.   
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